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Abstract: 21 
Gene drive is a naturally occurring phenomenon in which selfish genetic elements manipulate 22 
gametogenesis and reproduction to increase their own transmission to the next generation. 23 
Currently there is great excitement about the potential of harnessing such systems to control 24 
major pest and vector populations. If synthetic gene drive systems can be constructed and 25 
applied to key species, they may be able to rapidly spread, either modifying or eliminating 26 
the targeted populations. This approach has been lauded as a revolutionary and efficient 27 
mechanism to control insect-borne diseases and crop pests. Driving endosymbionts have 28 
already been deployed to combat the transmission of dengue and zika virus in mosquitos. 29 
However, there are a variety of barriers to successfully implementing gene drive techniques 30 
in wild populations. There is a risk that targeted organisms will rapidly evolve an ability to 31 
suppress the synthetic drive system, rendering it ineffective. There are also potential risks of 32 
synthetic gene drivers invading non-target species or populations. This Special Feature covers 33 
the current state of affairs regarding both natural and synthetic gene drive systems with the 34 
aim to identify knowledge gaps. By understanding how natural drive systems spread through 35 




1. Introduction  40 
 41 
All organisms harbour a variety of genes that violate the assumption of equal transmission, 42 
instead selfishly increasing their frequency in subsequent generations (called drive) at a cost 43 
to the genome as a whole. Such selfish genes can make up a substantial proportion of the 44 
genome, and show a range of strategies to enhance their spread [1]. Some gene drives are 45 
transmission distorters that target gametogenesis to ensure they are over-represented in 46 
eggs or sperm following meiosis, resulting in effective transmission distortion. Such meiotic 47 
drivers were first described almost a century ago and have been characterised in plants, 48 
insects, and mammals [1]. They may be autosomal (e.g. t haplotype in house mice Mus 49 
musculus, which is transmitted from males to up to 100% of offspring – [2]), or linked to one 50 
of the sex-chromosomes resulting in sex ratio distortion (e.g. SR in flies, causing up to 100% 51 
daughters [3]). Synthetic gene drives have recently been developed that produce similar 52 
results - transmitting themselves to nearly all offspring. If synthetic gene drive systems can be 53 
constructed and inserted into pest populations, they may be able to rapidly spread, 54 
potentially disrupting the function of a vital gene leading to population extinction [4, 5], or 55 
converting the entire population to males [6]. Alternatively, the gene drive could carry with it 56 
a package of genes, aimed at permanently modifying the target population. Possible 57 
modifications include making mosquitos incapable of transmitting malaria [7], or increasing 58 
their vulnerability to pesticides. 59 
 60 
The potential of harnessing gene drive systems in the control of major pests has been 61 
received with both enthusiasm and scepticism. This approach has been lauded as a 62 
revolutionary and efficient mechanism to control insect-borne diseases and crop pests, being 63 
highly targeted and potentially vastly cheaper than conventional methods such as pesticides 64 
[8]. However, there are a variety of barriers, both technical and ethical, to implementing this 65 
technique in wild populations. We urgently need to understand how natural drive systems 66 
spread through populations if we are to predict the outcomes of synthetic drive release. One 67 
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key barrier is the risk that target populations will rapidly evolve an ability to suppress the 68 
drive system, rendering it ineffective, as has been seen in natural drive systems [9]. So how 69 
much do we currently know about the dynamics of gene drivers?  70 
 71 
 72 
2. Scope of the special issue 73 
 74 
This Special Feature issue comprises 14 contributions, covering a wide range of aspects of 75 
natural and synthetic gene drivers in a range of animal and plant species. We introduce and 76 
discuss these below grouped into three broad topics: (i) Synthetic drive systems, (ii) Natural 77 
drive systems, and (iii) Implementation success and wider ethical considerations of gene 78 
drives.  79 
 80 
i) Synthetic drive systems 81 
 82 
The Special Feature starts with two reviews. The first, Ritchie and Staunton [10], reflects on 83 
the lessons to be learnt from 20 years of involvement in the most advanced programme of 84 
gene drive intervention: the use of the endosymbiont Wolbachia to suppress transmission by 85 
mosquitos. They discuss the history of mosquito control, from pesticides, through natural 86 
enemies, and sterile male releases, and the limitations of these approaches that have led to 87 
the urgent need for more effective solutions. They then discuss the discovery of a strain of 88 
the intracellular parasite Wolbachia, which when inserted into Aedes aegypti mosquitoes 89 
reduces dengue transmission to humans. This strain of Wolbachia spreads through mosquito 90 
populations by cytoplasmic incompatibility: eggs of uninfected females cannot be fertilised in 91 
matings with males infected with Wolbachia, but eggs of infected females can be fertilised by 92 
infected and uninfected males, giving infected females a fitness advantage. Since the release 93 
of these mosquitos in Cairns, Australia, the city has been dengue free, making this the most 94 
successful gene drive intervention to date. 95 
 96 
The second review, by Barrett et al [11], focuses on gene drive in plants; an area where 97 
relatively little gene drive work has been carried out. They summarise many of the key 98 
opportunities and questions, and discuss strategies to use synthetic gene drive to improve 99 
the control of weeds. One key approach is direct population suppression by killing target 100 
plant species. However, they suggest that a more useful approach may be modification, 101 
making weed species more vulnerable to traditional control techniques such as pesticides. 102 
For agricultural uses, this has enormous potential, as it limits the killing effect of the driver to 103 
populations targeted by pesticides, radically reducing any impact of the driver on non-target 104 
populations. Another interesting use is to enhance the survival of endangered plant species 105 
by driving specific useful genes, such as drought tolerance, into vulnerable populations. In 106 
particular, the review highlights the issue of seed-banking, the long term persistence of seeds 107 
in the soil. Barrett et al [11] show that the seed bank can slow the spread of gene drive by 108 
acting as a reservoir of wild type seeds. This issue is largely unique to plants, although it could 109 
perhaps be applicable to animals with cryptobiotic phases, such as tardigrades, nematodes, 110 
and rotifers.  111 
 112 
Beaghton and colleagues [12] focus on gene conversion drive, which have become relatively 113 
easy to construct due to the advent of CRISPR/Cas9. This type of drive uses a synthetic 114 
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nuclease driver that copies itself onto homologous chromosomes, allowing it to rapidly 115 
spread through populations. If the drive disrupts a key gene related to fertility, its spread 116 
could radically reduce the productivity of the population. This paper focuses on the issue of 117 
non-functional resistance at target genes. Modelling and practical experiments (e.g. 118 
Oberhofer et al [13]) have found that the targeted gene can rapidly evolve to be 119 
unrecognisable to the driver, preventing gene conversion, and allowing this resistant allele to 120 
maintain functional versions of the targeted gene in the population. However, an 121 
unappreciated issue is that mutations can also create unrecognisable target alleles without 122 
maintaining function in the target gene. Previously this possibility has been largely 123 
overlooked, as non-functional resistant alleles still lead to the genes in the population 124 
becoming increasingly damaged. However, here Beaghton et al [12] point out that there is 125 
typically a cost to the drive mechanism. Non-functional resistant alleles do not bear the cost 126 
of drive, and are immune to gene conversion, so can potentially spread through populations 127 
containing drive, reducing the spread of the driver. This is a great illustration of how 128 
important it is for modelling and empirical work to closely inform each other during the 129 
design and use of a synthetic drive. 130 
 131 
The next paper, by Holman [14] also models an interesting but unexplored area of gene drive, 132 
the potential use of synthetic meiotic drivers in species with ZW sex determination systems. 133 
In ZW organisms like butterflies and birds, females have the heterozygous sex chromosomes. 134 
The model suggests that W-shredding Z chromosome drivers, whose female carriers only 135 
produce sons, should spread extremely rapidly if the evolution of resistance can be avoided. 136 
This model is a major step forward in the development of gene drives for unexplored ZW pest 137 
species, including the trematodes that cause schistosomiasis, and serious Lepidopteran 138 
agricultural pests. 139 
 140 
There is also real interest in using synthetic gene drive as a conservation measure to control 141 
invasive species such as rats and mice that have caused serious decline to many vulnerable 142 
endemic bird, mammal and lizard populations. Godwin and colleagues [15] review the 143 
possibilities of using gene drives to control pest populations of rodents. They consider 144 
proposed CRISPR- based homology-directed repair drive systems (which have not yet been 145 
made to work robustly in mice [16]), and also the modification of a widespread ancient house 146 
mouse drive system, the t haplotype, into a sex ratio driver. An advantage of co-opting an 147 
ancient drive system, in which suppressors have not been found, is that rapid evolution of 148 
resistance may be less of a problem. Manser et al. [17] further explore this t haplotype based 149 
synthetic driver, which is in development. The t haplotype is an autosomal sperm-killing 150 
driver that manipulates sperm so that nearly all offspring from a heterozygous male inherit 151 
the t haplotype. The t-Sry project aims to take the key mammalian sex determination gene 152 
Sry from the mouse Y chromosome, and insert it onto the t haplotype on chromosome 17, 153 
thus creating “t-Sry”, an autosomal gene drive that turns all individuals that inherit it into a 154 
male. The idea is to introduce t-Sry to island mouse pest populations, thereby turning the 155 
entire population male and eliminating it altogether [18, 19]. Manser et al [17] explore the 156 
population dynamics of the t-Sry system. They model introductions of t-Sry to islands where 157 
female mice have varying rates of polyandry (multiple mating). As the t haplotype damages 158 
sperm, bearers have poor success when the females they mate with also mate with wild type 159 
males with undamaged sperm. Manser’s models [17] suggest that populations with high 160 
rates of polyandry will make it more difficult for t-Sry to spread, requiring higher release 161 
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effort. As polyandry is widespread in nature [20], these results may be relevant also for other 162 
drive systems that reduce male sperm competitiveness. 163 
 164 
Godwin et al [15] further highlight some key biological, regulatory and safety challenges for 165 
using gene drives in mice. The biology, ecology and behaviour of target island rodent 166 
populations remain poorly understood. At least as important, they follow Ritchie and 167 
Staunton [10] and George et al. [21] in emphasising how crucial it will be for regulatory 168 
frameworks to keep up with the pace of gene drive research, and how vital it is to ensure 169 
that the communities and stakeholders affected are consulted, informed, and given a major 170 
role in any decisions about the deployment of drives. 171 
 172 
ii) Natural drive systems 173 
 174 
Understanding how synthetic drive systems are likely to spread in nature, before any 175 
releases, is critical to the assessment of risks and benefits of synthetic drivers. Fortunately, 176 
the study of natural drive systems over the last century has provided considerable theoretical 177 
and empirical insight into how drivers work and how they spread. Until recently, we have 178 
been lacking sufficient data on fitness costs of natural drivers to make models about their 179 
spread in nature that match well to driver frequencies observed in wild populations.  180 
 181 
In this Special Feature, four studies report on fitness costs associated with male meiotic 182 
drivers. These drivers act during sperm development to eliminate their competition, namely, 183 
non-driver carrying sperm, which promotes their own transmission. Finnegan et al [22], 184 
Larner et al [23], Dyer and Hall [24], and Lea and Unckless [25] measured fitness costs in 185 
males and females associated with their species-specific meiotic driver, in stalk-eyed flies 186 
Teleopsis dalmanni, in the fruit fly Drosophila pseudoobscura, in D. recens, and in D. 187 
melanogaster, D. affinis and D. neotestacea, respectively. These fitness costs are apparent as 188 
reduced egg-to-adult viability [22], reduced offspring production in females [23, 24], and 189 
reduced sperm competition success [24]. Fitness costs are however trait-specific. Lea and 190 
Unckless [25] found no reduced immune function associated with male meiotic drive, and 191 
Dyer and Hall [24] found no effects on female mating preferences or on longevity. Larner et 192 
al [23] and Dyer and Hall [24] then used the quantified fitness costs to parameterise 193 
population genetic models to predict equilibrium frequencies in nature. These predicted 194 
frequencies came close to observed frequencies. This is an important step in understanding 195 
the dynamics of natural drive systems, and while the details will vary between systems, 196 
collectively these studies broaden the appreciation of potential fitness costs in nature. The 197 
drive systems investigated in these four studies lie within large chromosomal rearrangements 198 
that prevent recombination from breaking up critical drive elements [22, 25]. It remains 199 
unknown to what extent these fitness costs arise solely as a consequence of reduced 200 
recombination, which allows the accumulation of harmful mutations, or are pleiotropic 201 
effects of the drivers themselves.  202 
 203 
Fitness costs also select for the evolution of genetic suppressors of drive. Suppressors are 204 
present in most Drosophila drive systems [26], yet not in D. pseudoobscura. Price et al [27] 205 
consider why this might be. The low, stable drive frequencies observed in the wild can be 206 
explained by fitness costs arising from the combined effect of poor sperm competitive ability 207 
of SR males and costs to homozygous SR females. Yet these fitness costs affecting driver 208 
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dynamics still imply that the evolution of suppression of drive would be advantageous. The 209 
absence of suppressors is therefore puzzling. This Drosophila drive system has persisted in 210 
nature for at least hundreds of thousands of years [28], leading Price et al [27] to question 211 
whether ancient drive systems might be evolutionarily distinct from younger ones. 212 
Discovering the mechanisms underlying this drive system would help clarify whether there 213 
are particular genetic constraints that make the evolution of suppression less likely, and if 214 
they are common to other ancient systems that also have not evolved genetic suppression 215 
[27]. 216 
 217 
Thus an understanding of the genetic architecture of natural drive systems is important for 218 
understanding their effects and how drivers evolved, but also can help inform the design of 219 
synthetic drivers. Homing endonuclease drive systems were described in yeast and bacteria, 220 
later inspiring synthetic homing endonuclease drive systems [4, 29]. The synthetic Medea 221 
driver developed for the crop pest Drosophila suzukii took inspiration from the natural drive 222 
system of the same name [30], known from Tribolium flour beetles [31]. The development of 223 
synthetic X chromosome shredders in mosquitoes [6] is preceded by the discovery in 224 
mosquitoes of a natural X chromosome shredder [32], and the synthetic sex ratio distorter 225 
being developed in house mice [17-19] is directly based on modification of  the t haplotype 226 
[33]. Courret et al. [26] review the origins and mechanisms of the 19 known drivers in 227 
Drosophila showing that nearly all of the well-characterised systems evolve from gene 228 
duplications and involve heterochromatin regulation, small RNA and/or nuclear transport 229 
pathways. Uncovering how these systems work is made difficult by their association with 230 
inversions, heterochromatin, and epistatic interactions [26].  231 
 232 
Gene expression studies can help identify what elements of drive systems do. In Lindholm et 233 
al [34], the transcriptome of the house mouse t haplotype, is analysed. Carrying one copy of 234 
the t haplotype primarily altered the expression in testis of spermatogenesis genes, both of 235 
genes mapping to the t haplotype but also in a larger number of genes in the rest of the 236 
genome. Whether these trans gene regulation effects are achieved by transcription factors, 237 
non-coding RNA, chromatin modification, or other processes is currently unknown. Other 238 
tissues showed fewer differences, and these were mainly localised to the t haplotype. This 239 
study points to a fine-scaled adaptation of the driver to the rest of the genome, or extensive 240 
co-adaptation between them. Can we expect synthetic drivers to evolve to show similar 241 
patterns, given enough generations? 242 
 243 
iii) Implementation success and wider ethical considerations of gene drive 244 
 245 
There has been much discussion of the risks and benefits of harnessing gene drives as a 246 
means to regulate and suppress pest and vector populations in the wild – in particular 247 
malaria-transmitting mosquitoes [5, 35]. Gene drives have also been proposed as an effective 248 
and humane means to regulate invasive species, for example rodents on islands (see Godwin 249 
et al [15]; Manser et al [17] in this issue) [36]. The potential benefits are impressive: a 250 
reduced risk of insect-transmitted disease, reduced reliance on pesticides with all the 251 
associated detrimental side effects (such as bioaccumulation in human food [37], or non-252 
target wildlife poisoning [38]). In addition, there are the increasing costs of pesticide 253 
deployment due to the inevitable emergence of resistance, and the continued risk of disease 254 
spread by resistant vectors. There are also substantial risks associated with the use of 255 
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synthetic gene drives. One risk is the spilling over of gene drives into non-target populations 256 
and species. Despite the low likelihood of a gene drive transferring between species, the US 257 
National Academy of Sciences currently recommend that the risk of horizontal gene transfer 258 
should be evaluated before any environmental release of a gene drive is considered [8]. In 259 
addition to the direct risks of gene drives affecting non-target species, it is also important to 260 
assess the broader consequences that removal or alteration of the target population or 261 
species will have on the wider ecosystem.  262 
 263 
The debate surrounding this technology stems in part from insufficient knowledge about 264 
natural, let alone synthetic gene drivers. The consensus seems to be that it is not currently 265 
possible to evaluate whether the benefits outweigh the risks, but that this should not mean 266 
that research and trials using gene drive should be banned. For example, the 267 
recommendation by the Royal Society [39] to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity 268 
(CBD) is to avoid the adoption of any position that would support an international 269 
moratorium on gene drive research, including experimental field trials, a position which was 270 
echoed at the United Nations CBD meeting in November last year [40]. The moratorium was 271 
eventually rejected. The objection arose in part because if research into gene drives was 272 
prohibited, the knock-on effect would be detrimental since it would in effect preclude any 273 
wider public debate before we have determined the potential risk and therefore evaluated 274 
how we might safely use this technology.  275 
 276 
The moratorium was however reworded to emphasise the need to consult with local 277 
communities and indigenous groups that are potentially affected before a potential release is 278 
considered, echoing the recommendations by George et al [21] and Ritchie and Stanton [10] 279 
in this issue. In general, any potential future use of gene drives should be preceded by public 280 
debate about the relative appeal of using gene drives compared with alternative solutions. 281 
Much importance has been placed on ensuring future research is appropriately governed to 282 
encompass a variety of broader societal impacts, in addition to considering biosecurity and 283 
unwanted ecological and health impacts [35]. Such a consultative approach is stressed in the 284 
contribution by George et al [21], who also highlight the complexities surrounding the ethical 285 
considerations of releasing engineered gene drivers in nature. The importance of ensuring 286 
sufficient public and political confidence is also emphasised by Ritchie and Staunton [10], 287 
who argue that this is key to ensure wider uptake. The success of this approach is exemplified 288 
by the work carried out by Target Malaria (targetmalaria.org/who-we-are/), a not-for-profit 289 
research consortium that aims to develop and share technology for malaria control. The 290 
consortium includes scientists, stakeholder engagement teams, risk assessment specialists 291 
and regulatory experts from Africa, North America and Europe, and includes an ethics 292 
advisory committee. 293 
 294 
As yet, apart from making use of naturally occurring endosymbionts such as Wolbachia to 295 
disrupt disease transmission in mosquitoes, no synthetic gene drive has been released into a 296 
wild population. The US Department of Agriculture has excluded genome-edited plants from 297 
regulatory oversight, so this may change. The Australian government also recently decided 298 
that they will not regulate the use of gene-editing techniques that do not introduce new 299 
genetic material into organisms, but will increase their monitoring requirements of gene-300 
drive experiments [41]. In contrast, the European Union Court of Justice has ruled that gene-301 
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edited crops should be treated as genetically modified organisms subject to stringent 302 
regulation [42]. Clearly there is no global consensus.  303 
 304 
The use of ‘biological’ control measures such as the endosymbiont Wolbachia that when 305 
introduced into Aedes aegypti mosquitoes suppresses transmission of dengue, Zika and 306 
chikungunya viruses, has already seen extensive field trials in Australia and elsewhere [10, 307 
43]. The first successful use of cytoplasmically-induced male sterility to control Culex 308 
mosquitoes was carried out in Burma >50 years ago [44], and several large pilot releases of 309 
wMel-modified Aedes mosquitoes are currently underway (World Mosquito Program: 310 
http://www.eliminatedengue.com/our-research/wolbachia). Their successful deployment is 311 
reliant on strong community and political support (e.g. the successful World Mosquito 312 
Program aimed at eliminating dengue), as without it they are likely to fail, as in the case of 313 
several approved trials lacking support [10]. It is noteworthy that the use of naturally 314 
occurring agents such as Wolbachia (that can cause effective sterilisation by inducing 315 
cytoplasmic incompatibility) appears to be less fraught with concerns about their safety 316 
compared to synthetic gene drives. However, Wolbachia-infected mosquitoes effectively 317 
drive genes into populations and can therefore be viewed as analogous to gene drives [45]. Is 318 
it possible that the more we learn to harness these naturally occurring gene drivers the more 319 
our current apprehension about the use of synthetic drivers will be lessened? 320 
 321 
  322 
3. Concluding remarks and future directions.  323 
 324 
A number of general conclusions and promising avenues for future research emerge from the 325 
individual contributions in this issue. Below, we highlight some of the most significant points:  326 
 327 
We need to consider not just the technical but also the ethical and societal aspects of 328 
synthetic gene drive. As Ritchie and Staunton [10], and George et al [21] argue, support from 329 
the communities affected by gene drive releases is critical to their successful 330 
implementation. It is absolutely essential that any future releases make major efforts to 331 
explain all relevant aspects of the project and gain the support of local stakeholders. The 332 
furore over genetically modified crops illustrates how badly wrong a project can go if it does 333 
not enjoy public confidence. The only way these potentially lifesaving gene drive technologies 334 
are going to be practically useful is if they start off well, with successful projects that gain 335 
substantial local support. An arrogant top-down approach risks making gene drive 336 
technologies politically toxic, rendering them unusable for decades. This would be potentially 337 
tragic for human health, agriculture, and conservation. However, there are success stories 338 
[10], so this consultative approach can work. Is it possible that there are broad lessons to be 339 
learnt from the successful use of harnessing natural systems such as Wolbachia to reduce 340 
disease transmission in mosquitoes that can be implemented also for deployment of 341 
synthetic drive?  342 
 343 
Understanding the costs are key to predicting the dynamics of gene drive. There have been 344 
great inroads made into quantifying the potential costs of gene drive in natural systems as 345 
reported in this Special Feature. However, fitness costs can be hard to find: for example, the 346 
finding of Finnegan et al [22] of reduced viability associated with meiotic drive in stalk-eyed 347 
flies came after multiple previous studies of fitness costs in the same species. In particular, 348 
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we need to better document the potential cost of drive in less well characterised natural 349 
drive system involving non-model species (i.e. other than flies and house mice). We also do 350 
not know if these costs are modified over time as would be predicted by a coevolutionary 351 
response. For example, the cost to female D. simulans flies of harbouring the Riverside strain 352 
of Wolbachia has gone from an initial 15-20% fecundity cost to an 10% fecundity advantage 353 
after only 20 years of coevolution [46]. Quantifying fitness costs of drive in both males and 354 
females is vital to accurately predict the dynamics of drive in natural populations (e.g. [23, 355 
24]). Subtle costs of drive can also affect the success of synthetic drives. Beaghton et al. [12] 356 
also investigate the transgenerational impact of empirically demonstrated fitness costs, 357 
which has been a surprising discovery in synthetic gene drive research. There is clearly scope 358 
both to better refine existing predictive models and to accumulate more data on potential 359 
fitness costs in synthetic drive systems to improve our forecasting of synthetic driver 360 
dynamics in natural populations. 361 
 362 
The relative importance of balancing costs vs suppression for gene drive success. Key to the 363 
success of implementing synthetic gene drive for population control is their persistence for 364 
sufficient amount of time to achieve reduction (or elimination) of the target population. 365 
Hence delaying the likelihood and speed of the evolution of suppression is an essential 366 
target. However, the persistence of many natural gene drive systems appears to be 367 
dependent on the strength of balancing selection [22-24, 27] rather than on the evolution of 368 
suppression. Currently we do not know what features of a gene drive system make it more or 369 
less likely to be shaped by balancing selection as opposed to suppression. We also do not 370 
know if there are any similarities between ancient gene drives in which suppressors have not 371 
been found (e.g. sex ratio drive in D. pseudoobscura, t haplotype in house mice, the long-372 
term persistence of Wolbachia-induced male killing in D. innubila [47]). In part this lack of 373 
insight stems from the limited knowledge about the gene(s) involved in drive, as the 374 
mechanisms are not known for many systems [26]. However, just as for sex ratio drive (e.g. 375 
D. simulans, [9, 48]), there are examples of male-killing systems displaying a dramatic flux of 376 
invasion, suppression, replacement, and resurgence of killing across populations (e.g. 377 
Hypolimnas bolina butterflies [49]). Comparisons between these natural drive systems may 378 
reveal potential features that are associated with the long-term persistence of unsuppressed 379 
drive systems that could perhaps be incorporated into the design of synthetic drivers. For 380 
example, are there potential costly pleiotropic consequences of suppression that are simply 381 
too great to overcome? On the other hand, it is possible that long-term persistence of 382 
unsuppressed systems is a feature of a complex drive system involving multiple genes and 383 
hence is unlikely to be translated in practice to synthetic drivers as they are simply too 384 
complex to construct. To date we do not even know if persistent gene drive is associated 385 
with a few or many coevolving genes. We clearly need to have a better understanding of the 386 
mechanisms of drive and suppression of natural systems before these insights can be 387 
translated into the design of synthetic drivers. 388 
 389 
In addition, there are several unexplored opportunities of gene drives: 390 
- Many of the proposed uses of gene drives involve reducing harm to humans from 391 
disease vectors, humanely removing introduced animals to benefit conservation, 392 
or combating crop pests or weeds [11, 15, 35, 36, 50], all of which could reduce 393 
deaths from disease and reduce the use of pesticides and poisons. There are, 394 
however, other potential uses [11], such as driving beneficial alleles into 395 
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populations to rapidly spread adaptive variation. Driving adaptive variation could 396 
hasten adaptation to potentially extinction-causing threats, such as climate 397 
change, or protecting amphibians from the chytrid fungus, which is already 398 
implicated in the extinction of 90 species [51].  399 
 400 
- Major concerns about the use of gene drives are that they will escape control, 401 
entering non-target populations, jumping between species, and having 402 
unintended negative consequences. However, it is possible that the safest and 403 
most effective use of gene drives will instead be to use them in coordination with 404 
existing control techniques [11]. For example, to target a weed a gene drive that 405 
carries susceptibility to a herbicide might be released in an agricultural area. This 406 
drive carries little immediate cost, so may spread rapidly. The fitness cost will only 407 
become apparent when herbicides are actually deployed in the fields, and the 408 
controlled use limits these costs to the target areas. Even if the gene drive spread 409 
to wild populations of the weed species, or related non-pest species, the cost of 410 
well-designed herbicide susceptibility is likely to be low except where herbicides 411 
are deployed. One of the issues with gene drives designed to spread rapidly and 412 
exterminate the target organism is monetarisation, as a drive that rapidly 413 
eradicates the target species has not got a long-term income stream. Gene drives 414 
developed as part of a holistic pest control plan, where damage from the driver is 415 
dependent on the deployment of a second factor, might be safe and controllable, 416 
long term financially successful, and more acceptable to the public.  417 
 418 
- The natural gene drives that have been discovered, and the synthetic drivers that 419 
have been constructed, are relatively direct in their action. They spread by 420 
converting genes, killing gametes that do not carry drive, shred rival 421 
chromosomes, and use other rather brute force approaches. However, it is likely 422 
that many more subtle possibilities for gene drive exist. In fact, many of them may 423 
already exist in nature, but have not yet been discovered because researchers are 424 
not looking for them, or interpreting them as drive. A fascinating example occurs 425 
in fire ants (Solenopsis invicta). A gene driver, the Gp-9 locus, within a large 426 
inversion, has behavioural effects on drive-carrying workers that result in a 427 
transmission advantage for the locus – by selective elimination of non-carrier 428 
queens and tolerance of multiple carrier queens within the colony [52, 53]. It has 429 
ecological consequences, as fire ants are invasive in North America, and invasion 430 
success is associated with increased queen number [54]. There are likely to be 431 
other non-reproductive gene drives, perhaps driven by parental care biases, or 432 
siblicide, that have yet to be discovered, or thought of.  433 
 434 
Collectively, the contributions of this Special Feature demonstrate the tremendous potential 435 
of gene drive systems, but also highlights several outstanding knowledge gaps. In particular, 436 
the wider ethical and societal implications of harnessing and unleashing the power of selfish 437 
genes in natural populations are still only in the early stages of being addressed. 438 
 439 
 440 
  441 
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